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## **From Basic Instincts To Higher Values**

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The problem which I wish to explore in this paper is .....

.... how does the human mind develop its value system ?

This is, of course, an enormous question and I will only be able to address it in a limited way.

Philosophers have been concerned with the question of Ethics and Morals for some 2000 years.

However, within my limited reading - and even more limited understanding - it strikes me that most of the philosophers write as if there were a more or less uniform entity - an adult mind - which conceptualises ethical and moral issues, and brings them to bear on human behaviour.

It does not seem to me that the majority of philosophers allow for the reality of the need for minds to develop - nor the reality that minds do not all develop along the same path - nor the reality that human minds do not all develop to the same degree.

Another point - which I will attempt to make - would be that philosophers themselves are only able to think philosophically within the limits of their own mental developmental achievements and their own inner worlds. But perhaps more of this later.

It is one of my main contentions that a given mind needs to achieve an ability to hold certain moral values and that the attainment of relatively more mature levels of psychic development is a pre-requisite for the development of higher values.

In order to set the scene for my later trying to support this contention from a psychoanalytic perspective, please first join me in a fantasy journey.

You are a scientist aboard your spaceship hovering above the planet called "Earth". You observe, through your very high powered telephoto lens, a sixteen-legged creature writhing among leaves in a forest. Watching closely, you soon see the sixteen-legged creature separate into two eight-legged creatures. One of these, the larger of the two, then devours the other.

Having made these observations in your log book, you then notice some interference on your radar screen which soon forms itself into coherent images.

The mysterious images are accompanied by what you - a highly intelligent and accomplished scholar of interplanetary biological studies - recognise as a stray primitive television transmission from the planet Earth. Having previously deciphered the early communication skills of an interesting group of the bipedal inhabitants of this planet, you read:

" "Basic Instinct" ... starring Michael Douglas and Sharon Stone. "

The images soon devolve into a writhing four-legged creature, partially covered by a white sheet. Then the four legged creature further resolves into two two-legged creatures. The one of the two strikes out at the other repeatedly with an implement. Blood flows. The second creature lies motionless.

You - a dispassionate scientific observer - begin to think about the unusual mating behaviour of two of the species of organisms which appear to abound on planet Earth.

The two spiders copulating are of interest inasmuch as the female of the species devours its male mate after copulation. Such is the manner of the procreation of the spiders in question.

The two humans copulating are of interest - but for different reasons !

Can you remain a dispassionate scientific observer of this biological phenomenon ?

Coming down to Earth now ... while we may squirm in recognition of what is occurring between the two spiders, it is unlikely that our response will be more complex than perhaps a transient identification with either the male or the female - depending on our own proclivities. We will marvel at the way of Nature and its diversity.

Not so with the images portrayed in "Basic Instinct" !

Quite apart from the artistic merits of the film or otherwise, we will most likely have a strong response to the behaviour portrayed.

Not only will we recognise the "basic instincts" of sexuality and aggression, but we will inevitably form value judgements about the behaviour of the participants in this life and death drama.

We will bring to bear "higher values" in our assessment of what we saw.

You - as space travelling scientist - depending on your degree of knowledge of the species which inhabit the Earth - may know that the spiders are mindless creatures simply following their biological imperatives ... "doing what comes naturally", as sung by Annie in the musical "Annie Get Your Gun".

The humans, on the other hand, are not mindless creatures. Their possession of a mind makes them the most intriguing of creatures - and, in our frame of reference - releases them - at least to some arguable degree - from their biological imperatives.

We do not attribute motives to the lady spider.

We almost certainly will attribute psychological motivation to the lady Homo sapiens in the film.

Brutally murdering one's sexual partner does not come under the category of "doing what comes naturally" in the species Homo sapiens. The behaviour portrayed in the film is a creation of a human mind. We will immediately think of murderous hatred and conjure up developmental scenarios to account for a female psychopath capable of brutally, and apparently serially, killing her sexual partners.

My use of the word "brutally" illustrates the kind of problem involved in making value judgements which I wish to explore in this paper. Why "brutally" ? Is this an objective use of an adjective ?

Would our fantasy space scientist say the female spider "brutally" devoured her male mate ? To a scientist, are the two copulating couples of equal biological interest ?

I perhaps should refer to my phrase "dispassionate" scientist. Isn't "dispassionate scientist" a tautology ? Aren't all scientists "dispassionate" ?

Is science VALUE FREE ? Is Psychoanalysis VALUE FREE ?

You will respond "of course not !!!".

What are VALUES ? How are they formed ? How do they develop ?

I must now pause to try to define my field of exploration lest it become even broader than I fear it already is.

The words "VALUE" and "VALUES" are used in a variety of senses.

"The values of Psychoanalysis" is a vastly different phrase from "the Psychoanalysis of Values". And both differ from "the value of Psychoanalysis".

"The value of Psychoanalysis" is an arguable notion, which it is not at all my intention to approach in this paper !

"The Values of Psychoanalysis" refers to those values which derive from Psychoanalysis itself and which could apply to - or even interfere with - the study or practice of Psychoanalysis itself.

While ...

"The Psychoanalysis of Values" refers to a form of study whereby psychoanalytic methods of understanding are applied to the notion of "Values".

It is this latter issue, "The Psychoanalysis of Values", in particular, which I am interested in exploring with you, while the issue of the "Values of Psychoanalysis" will doubtless intrude, while I attempt to do so.

"Values" are a kindred notion to "beliefs", "ethics" and "morals" - and in their turn, each contribute to the formation of "attitudes". I consider "beliefs", "ethics" and "morals" to be clearly distinguishable from one another - but - there will inevitably be varying degrees of overlap in each of our minds.

It will not be controversial for me to assert that any human brain - despite being "hardwired" at birth for a variety of mental abilities, does not come into the world with a sense of identity or "self", nor with a verbal language of a particular kind, nor with an in-built "value system".

Each of these is acquired through appropriate interactions with a facilitating environment. Indeed we well know, that despite "hardwiring" predispositions and potentials, in the absence of a facilitating environment, each of a sense of identity, an effective verbal ability and a value system will not develop as effectively as might otherwise be possible.

Unfortunately, even in this statement, while I am sure that there would be little disagreement among us about what I have said, there are a significant number of value laden concepts inherent in my statement.

It is presumed that there are "higher" levels of development possible and that such "higher" levels are "better".

For an infant's mind to remain at the level of development at which it comes into the world is not considered by us as "desirable". We value development and the acquisition of "higher mental abilities".

A baby spider is better biologically equipped to survive in the world than a baby Homo sapiens. But the potential of the baby outstrips that of the spider by an astronomical degree.

While we will agree that we value the development of higher mental abilities, included among those higher mental abilities is the ability to form VALUES themselves.

By this I mean concepts such as justice, fairness, loyalty, patriotism, compassion, - and so on and so on.

But to ask the main question again ...

How does the human mind develop its higher order values ?

We will all be aware of Freud's well known formulation "The Superego is the heir to the Oedipus Complex".

This notion encompasses the idea that, at the successful attainment of a certain stage of psychosexual development, a new psychic agency will ( somehow ) come into existence which will serve to internalise the particular morality and cultural values of the society into which the particular individual was born.

The details of this Freudian formulation are of course arguable, but the principle is probably acceptable.

Couched in Kleinian terms - we would say a similar thing by asserting that with the attainment of the Depressive Position, an internal psychic mechanism probably has been developed which influences the moral relations between the internal objects in a given person's mind - and in turn influences the relationship of that individual with his or her objects.

In both these formulations, I am only at this stage asserting the mental ability to operate at a higher level than the more "basic" of either "instinct" dominated behaviour in the Freudian formulation or at a higher level than the "splitting" dominated behaviour of the Kleinian formulation.

However, merely to claim that the Superego has arrived or the Depressive Position has been arrived at, does not of itself determine any particular value system or morality -only that what I am calling "higher" values and morals are now likely to be well established within the given person's mind - and, conversely, have not been established in the individual until this development has been attained.

So much for the idea of a "level" of development. What about the content of that "level" ?

"One man's fish is another man's poison".

What to one man is a freedom fight is to another man terrorism.

We know only too well that one man's value system is anathema to another; that value systems are far from shared; and that people can take up diametrically opposite positions on any of a myriad of serious issues. We have only to read the Letters to the Editor in any major newspaper on any day, to appreciate how the same issue can arouse opposite opinions among the citizens of the one society.

Given then that we will probably agree that early psychic development significantly determines whether the ability to form a "higher" value system or a morality will be achieved ... will we agree that the content of such a morality or value system will equally be determined by early psychic developmental vicissitudes ?

Given that attitudes are likely determined, consciously or unconsciously by our value systems, does a person's attitude toward capitalism, socialism, communism, conscription, abortion, rape, foreign investment, migration, racism, republicanism or the monarchy - to list but a few - differ according to early developmental considerations ... or are we all capable of arriving at considered positions on each of these by drawing on our rational faculties ?

To ask some simplistic questions ....

Is capitalism the externalisation of pursuit of greed determined goals ?

Is communism a mass endeavour to defend against greed and envy and an attempt to construct a system of pseudo-equality and pseudo-sharing.

In South Africa, for example, was the policy of "apartheid" so widely accepted in the past as a means of externalising and defending against "internal blackness" ?

Closer to home ... when Fred Nile speaks out on abortion, or Thomas Keneally on republicanism, or Geoffrey Blainey on immigration, - are they espousing their rationally determined value systems for us all to adopt because they have done all the "homework" and research for us ?

Or are they, to varying degrees, driven by an unconscious imperative, which we could perhaps understand on an individual basis, if any of them were to grace our psychoanalytic couches ?

What of Justice Bollen and some of his judicial confreres, whose judgements have aroused such popular condemnation in recent times ?

Is "a normal amount of violence" in securing one's wife's participation in sexual intercourse a carefully weighed judicial pronouncement on the nature of human congress in our society - or did the judgement derive from other considerations within the mind of Justice Bollen ?

For each of these and those who agree with them, there are many who would vehemently disagree with them.

All this is to establish - I hope - that we agree that unconscious dynamics do influence our value systems and secondarily, thereby, our attitudes.

For example ... is genuine tolerance - one of the highest of human values - therefore the ability to tolerate within oneself the disparate hard-to-tolerate feelings which most people are prone to split off and project ?

The problem of the Psychopath is perhaps of basic relevance now to try to illustrate a strongly divergent set of positions.

Popularly - and among non-psychoanalytically oriented clinicians - the psychopath is inherently unable to value what we all as decent human beings would consider to be the notions of consideration, compassion, fairness and so on.

The psychopath, popularly, is held to be without a conscience; to be deficient in moral development; to be selfish in the extreme. Many consider this to be primarily a biological disorder. Some even hold that late maturation occurs, and that the older such person becomes "less psychopathic".

Psychoanalytically, however, we would hold that the psychopathic individual becomes so because of phenomena relevant to the infant's early facilitating environment and that perhaps such individuals are defending against a profound depression, resultant on early developmental vicissitudes.

( I am here myself guarding against introducing a value system determined by my own understanding of psychoanalysis and prefer not to say anything like "early maternal deprivation" or such like phraseology. This risks the "values of psychoanalysis" issue which I briefly referred to earlier. )

Even if there were early environmental determinants, this does not preclude the reality of neurobiological defects which in turn handicap the appropriate development of a social conscience - however formulated.

I contend that even the most psychopathic individual probably can know right from wrong - what he probably doesn't do is feel right from wrong.

Thus, in the extreme case of popularly understood lack of conscience, the primary defect is not a cognitive one - but an affective one.

For our present purposes, we can extend this notion and try to clearly distinguish between knowing right from from wrong and feeling right from wrong, across the human spectrum.

It is not likely that even the more psychologically primitive adults in our society do not know the meaning of even the most highly value laden concepts - at least in a dictionary definition sense.

The real developmental achievement is to feel a moral sense - not merely to know one.

Returning to psychopathy ... clinically, we know that psychopathy is strongly related to early deprivation of the kind of nurturing which we associate with the adequate development of "ruthful" as opposed to "ruthless" object relationships.

If we know this on an individual clinical level, dare we extrapolate to a level involving extreme early deprivation on a large scale such as that which must pertain in refugee camps around the world. These are the breeding ground of terrorist groups whose experience of deprivation,

alienation and dispossession are on a par with what we encounter clinically - yet multiplied manifold both in degree and number.

These are the breeding grounds of individuals capable of arranging for the explosion in mid-air of an airliner full of civilians, to publicise a political cause. Surely there is no evidence of compassion for fellow human beings involved here.

On another hand, was the recent bombing in London of a huge office block, with minimal human casualties the terrorist act of a group with a higher value system ? Largely, only property was damaged - to the tune of millions of pounds. Was this by design ?

To make an extreme point - with some trepidation, lest I be misinterpreted - if we again think from the perspective of being the dispassionate intergalactic scientist in orbit around our planet, would we consider all the behaviour we observe on planet earth from, say, a simplistic Darwinian "survival of the fittest" perspective or even from Richard Dawkins' "selfish gene" vantage point.

In other words, if an organism acts in its own interests, to ensure its own survival in a competitive environment, does it not qualify as being described as "successful" ?

By such a criterion, psychopathy is of significant survival value - maybe even - although I shudder to say so - a higher form of life.

Altruism - the opposite of psychopathy - is not of such effective survival value.

I am aware that the school of socio-biologists argue that altruism in fact favours survival of the group, and in the less drastic situations, this may well be so. Nevertheless, terrorist psychopaths would also argue that they are acting in the interests of their group.

If some value systems are "relative", if they can be in conflict between one individual and another, is there any universal overarching value system, which transcends the individual and the place ?

This kind of value system would more readily be called a moral system.

This leads, of course, to the issue of GOOD and EVIL. Is there any a priori universal moral value - a Categorical Imperative (as Kant called it) ?

I need here to clarify a point: I am excluding the possibility of a supernatural being. If there is any way in which a value system deriving from any source outside the planet Earth and its scientifically known entities, then my whole argument is a waste of time !

(More than that - perhaps I had better watch out !)

In the absence of the human mind - or at least prior to its evolutionary appearance - consideration of Good and Evil (probably) did not apply. Things simply "were" as they were. It requires the presence of a human mind to even begin to consider the question of values.

"There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so." Shakespeare has Hamlet say to Rosencrantz in Act II.

Prior to the evolution of Homo sapiens, species came and went. Who cried for the dinosaurs ?

Notwithstanding the early verses in Genesis stating that on the sixth day "... God saw everything He had made, and, behold, it was very good" (Genesis I, 31), I contend that it was only the evolutionary development of the mind of man which permitted the evaluation of good and evil.

As I have already said, philosophers have explored this basic human problem from earliest times.

The basic problem as I am attempting to explore it here is this : does "goodness" or "higher value" itself derive from mental development, or is human mental development itself oriented toward the development of an ability to discern an a priori good from an equally a priori evil ?

I am not well equipped to offer a useful summary of the history of Moral Philosophy.

However, if I simply read to you a chronological list of well known philosophers through the ages, you will be able to draw on your own knowledge of them to get an idea of the scope of "the big picture" which I am trying to convey.

Just let me warn you - it is an impressive list !

Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, Descartes, Pascal, Hobbes, Spinoza, Butler, Rousseau, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Bentham, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Marx, Engels, Spencer, Bradley, Nietzsche, Moore, James, Santayana, Dewey, Hare, Toulmin, Wittgenstein, Sartre, Camus, de Beauvoir, Lewis and Rawls ... to name just the better known philosophers who have made noteworthy contributions to this particular philosophical problem !

I am indebted to my colleague Shahid Najeeb, who, in paper to our Institute recently, offered a useful schema to handle this extremely complex issue.

He spoke of the writers to which I have just referred as dealing with Morality as an IDEA. That is, that Morality itself was the subject of inquiry.

The age old philosophical questions which they address are to do with

... what IS good ?

and ... what is it good TO DO ?

These philosophers advance concepts to do with idealism, empiricism, materialism, hedonism, cynicism, nihilism, relativism, utilitarianism, pragmatism, etc. etc. as the basis for moral behaviour.

What I am here wanting us to be concerned with is what Shahid Najeeb called "INTERNAL STRUCTURES as DETERMINANTS of MORALITY."

These are the concern of Psychoanalysis.

Freud and Klein are the authors who most readily spring to mind when we think about the development of internal structures - but - Fairbairn, Abraham, Winnicott and others should also be thought of.

As mentioned earlier, Freud relies on the advent of the Superego to bring about the regulation of behaviour under moral considerations. The whole thrust of one of his later papers - "Civilisation and Its Discontents" - addresses the inevitability of the conflict between instinctual drives and

parental-social inhibitions, resulting in the neurotic compromise formations with which we are familiar - and which, he claims, are universal in civilised societies.

However, at this point I would like to draw on two psychoanalytic authors who may not be as familiar names as those mentioned up until now, to represent the two main identifiable psychoanalytic models.

Both wrote influentially in the mid-1940's and through my reading for this paper, I discovered that they had already articulated the main issues which I was struggling to formulate.

J.C. Flugel is the author of "Man, Morals and Society", published in 1945, and Roger Money-Kyrle wrote several papers and books on the broad topic of Psychoanalysis and Ethics. One from 1945 and another from 1955 are included in his Collected Papers.

Another interesting paper addressing these same issues is by Heinrich Racker, entitled "Ethics and Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalysis of Ethics." in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis in 1966.

Flugel is clearly influenced mainly by the major Freudian conceptualisations of the time, while Money-Kyrle, who was analysed by Freud, Ernest Jones and Melanie Klein is an eloquent spokesperson for the newer Kleinian concepts which were being developed in the 1940s - and which he convincingly utilises to make his own contribution to this cross-disciplinary field of enquiry.

Flugel traces the development of the Super-ego as well as the origin and function of the Ego Ideal.

In a later chapter entitled "The Psychology of Moral progress" he outlines a number of developmental paths, which will give you a flavour of the kind of concepts he uses.

1. From Egocentricity to Sociality
2. From Unconscious to Conscious
3. From Autism to Realism
4. From Moral Inhibition to Spontaneous "Goodness"
5. From Aggression to Tolerance and Love
6. From Fear to Security
7. from Heteronomy to Autonomy
8. From Moral Judgement to cognitive Judgement

I'm sure you'll recognise what he is getting at and you'll probably not have too much argument with the main issues he is advancing. Nevertheless, it does have a somewhat "old fashioned" ring to it.

Money-Kyrle on the other hand, writing only slightly later than Flugel, was strongly influenced by Kleinian thinking and his contributions feel almost completely "modern" to our object relations attuned ears.

Before coming to the application of the then newer ways of conceptualising the unconscious contribution to formation of moral systems, Money-Kyrle says that whenever a problem - in this case, the problem of ethics and morality - has remained unanswered for thousands of years, this is usually because it has been expressed in such a way that it is either logically or empirically unanswerable. (p. 178)

The metaphysical form of the question, "What ends ought we to seek ?", he argues, involves the assumption of a priori ends. He asserts that this question is logically unanswerable.

The theological form of the question Money-Kyrle states is "What does God want us to seek ?". Because of the multiplicity of possible answers based on the multiplicity of religious systems, he asserts that this question is empirically unanswerable.

He offers as the psychological equivalent of the question: "What does our Super-ego want us to seek ?"

Here an empirical answer is available. As the answer is different for different Super-egos, he says that the answer will be relative and subjective - and not absolute and general.

He goes on to propose a Psychoanalytical Theory of Ethics by posing FOUR questions:

1. How does morality originate and what is its primary form ?
2. How do moral aims deviate in the course of development ?
3. What degrees of deviation are normal and what abnormal ?
4. What are the prospects for the future ?

My own ponderings about the first of these questions stimulated the writing of this paper - any addressing of the other three questions will have to await another paper one future day.

Money-Kyrle states that "the origin of morality in the individual is of course closely connected with the sense of guilt". (p. 184)

He advances a schema for three kinds of primitive morality:

Firstly, a negative morality based on the avoidance of punishment for destructive aggression.

Secondly, a positive morality based on the aim of repairing damage already done to the good object.

And, thirdly, another form of positive morality based on defending the good object from third-party attacks.

He explains that the Freudian notion of the superego exacting guilt for any real or phantasied transgressions is less universally applicable than a Kleinian perspective which holds that guilt is "a peculiar blend of anxiety and despair that follows aggressive acts or phantasies against a loved object".

I would here argue explicitly - as Money-Kyrle go on to argue implicitly - that the primitive mind - of necessity - makes some kind of value judgement before the sense of guilt could conceivably be called into effect.

However - because this is occurring at such an early stage of mental life, I consider that the term "value judgement" in this regard is of no use, and a word like "distinguishes" will need to be used instead.

Thus I am arguing that the primitive mind "distinguishes between" good and bad - and in turn develops a sense of guilt whenever it "senses" (somehow) that it has damaged a "good object" within its own inner world.

Money-Kyrle advances (as I was going to do) a bio-psychological argument, paralleling the most primitive organism's ability to "distinguish between" what is good for it and what is bad for it - and then incorporate the good, while expelling the bad.

This is essentially the biological cycle of ingestion and elimination, becoming the psychological cycle of introjection and projection.

Thus, he says, "are built up three fundamental subjective principles of primary morality:

it is bad (i.e. arouses guilt) to injure or threaten a good object; it is good to love, repair and defend a good object; it is also good to hate, attack or destroy a bad object, that is, any thing or person that threatens to destroy a good object." (p. 187)

These three principles are empirical discoveries of psychoanalysis - they are general and not specific to certain individuals.

"The basis of morality is therefore neither a priori and universal as the metaphysicians claimed, nor empirical and relative as critical philosophers (...) maintain - but empirical and universal in the sense that it is a quality, like binocular vision or an articulated thumb, which is found to be common to all mankind". (p. 187)

With Money-Kyrle, I would argue that the basis for distinguishing between what is good for the organism - that is good for oneself - and what is bad - that is bad for oneself - becomes the future basis for the psychological distinguishing between good and bad in the broader context.

Thus ... in the sense that Freud proclaimed that the first ego is a "body ego" - so the first morality is a biological morality.

On whatever basis the primitive mental apparatus makes a distinction between - presumably - what feels good from what feels bad, and retains the former, while projecting - or otherwise externalising - the latter, this will provide the prototypic moral categories of the individual.

So for example, in our terms, therefore, the "greed is good" morality portrayed in the film "Wall Street" must derive from a quite primitive stage of mental development.

You will justifiably say "If this is so, then this will be the case for all individuals who have not satisfactorily dealt with their own greed - and therefore all such individuals will become Gordon Gekkoes ... their moral systems should all turn out the same."

Not so. As we are all familiar - the vicissitudes of individual experience and development now come into play, and each individual must struggle to achieve his or her own moral system. Nevertheless, the basis on which such a moral system will be constructed is that of projection and introjection as described in object relations accounts of the development of mind.

This claim that very early mental life provides the basis of future value systems, offers the possibility for a psychologically sound basis for Kant's notion of an a priori Category.

By this, Kant claimed that the human mind structures the world of experience according to pre-existing mental Categories - and not that such categories are derived from experience.

I am personally not persuaded by Kant's notion of "The Categories" - but what I am here putting forward comes rather close to espousing an a priori pair of categories: good and bad.

I am not suggesting, however, that they "pre-exist" - but rather that they come into existence very early in the infant's mental life.

Future experiences - both internally generated and externally encountered - will be evaluated as either good or bad according to these most primitive of categories. But like so many other mental phenomena, the categories themselves will be subject to maturation and refinement, and permit some individuals to achieve a greater than usual degree of development.

I would also add as evidence of primitive "value judgements" the notion of the development of an "Ego Ideal" as implying some primitive ability to construct within the developing mind a notion of something "better" than that which exists. That is, an "ego ideal" to be striven for, in contrast to the ego which has control of the mental apparatus.

Having referred to a typically Freudian concept - the ego ideal - let me resurrect another typically Freudian notion for renewed examination.

This is the notion that the Unconscious is amoral. At the same time we may remember my earlier references to psychopathy.

I would now contend that neither the Unconscious - nor a Psychopath - nor any other psychic construct for that matter - can be held to be amoral. The Unconscious may be "dysmoral" - but it cannot avoid making even the most primitive value judgements as it goes about its business !

Neville Symington's paper on Psychopathy in the 1980 volume of the International Review of Psychoanalysis, strongly makes the point that Psychopaths are far from amoral, and that their very perverse morality can be understood in terms of their object relationships, which are characterised by gross splitting and denial.

To repeat - if what I have proposed does provide the primitive basis for the later development of ethical and moral values, the nature of such value systems is now open to elaboration by the individual developing mind according to the vicissitudes of individual experience - in whatever socio-cultural environment the individual may be raised.

Another important point which I desire to establish, is a corollary of the insistence that morality has its origins in object relatedness - and that is that morality has no meaning outside of an interpersonal and intersubjective context.

One can derive from the notion that an individual's morality is based on what is good or bad for him or her, the assertion that family and small group morality will equally depend on what is good or bad for the family or small group. Further, larger groups and indeed nations will also derive their value systems similarly.

Each of these however, will depend entirely on the level of maturity of the internal object relations achieved by the influential individuals in each group in question.

Moral and Ethical behaviour are, in the final analysis, only of any meaning in relationship to other human beings - both on an individual level and on a group level.

All human interpersonal behaviour then, comes down to an expression of the underlying value system - the morality - of the individual or group.

Morality cannot exist in a vacuum ...

There is no morality without an object relationship.

I would now like to take the liberty of again wandering outside my field - and - think about the Philosopher Friederich Nietzsche, in order to take up the issue I hinted at at the outset ... that of a philosopher being limited to the parameters of his own internal world.

Interestingly, but as an aside, Nietzsche represents an interesting point of intersection between philosophy and psychoanalysis.

It is thought that Freud must have been more influenced by Nietzsche than he gives credit, as Nietzsche was influential in Vienna at Freud's time. Nietzsche himself had a brief but highly important relationship with Lou Andreas Salome, who in turn herself later was influenced by and had an equally important relationship with Freud.

As background, I have also been influenced by recently reading a "pseudo-quasi-historical" novel by Irvin Yalom called "When Nietzsche Wept".

You may have heard of this recent novel. Yalom cleverly and interestingly "reconstructs" a hypothetical meeting between Josef Breuer and Friederich Nietzsche - orchestrated by Lou Andreas Salome. I will assume that Yalom has done his homework and represents Nietzsche within known biographical parameters in his creation of the character of Nietzsche in the novel. (He has in his book done pretty well with Breuer, Freud and Salome, judging by what I know from other sources).

For Nietzsche's actual writings, I draw here on a book called "Friederich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul" by Leslie Paul Thiele.

Thiele says of Nietzsche " ... any true philosophy, according to Nietzsche, must first be lived, and only subsequently transmitted. In short, one cannot separate the philosopher from his work: the personal is the philosophical - and - the philosophical is the personal."

It would be impertinent of me to try to crystallise the work of Nietzsche in any way. Let me, though, remind you of some of the better known issues which are at the heart of his life's opus.

The notion of the heroic individual - the need to transcend externally derived morality - is crystallised in the concept of the "Urbmensch". Although this is often translated as "Superman" and was probably as such exploited by both Wagner and Hitler, I feel my use of the word "transcend" captures Nietzsche's intent expressed as the need to transcend both internal and external demands and to forge one's own independent morality.

Something like Shakespeare's "To thine own self be true" (Also from "Hamlet").

Thiele says ""The Nietzschean project was, in short, to instill a passion for greatness in a world without gods".

Nietzsche refers - almost contemptuously - to the need to transcend the requirements of "the herd". By this he means the expectations of Society. In the struggle between the needs of an ordered society and the needs for the individual to express himself freely, Nietzsche is firmly and exclusively on the side of the individual.

In the interests of understanding the personality of the philosopher in question, it would probably be not too unreasonable to characterise much of what is known of Nietzsche's personality as a mixture of Narcissistic and Schizoid traits. The despair that Yalom describes was probably a profound chronic depression.

He was born into a staunchly Lutheran family - his father a minister in that faith, died of an indeterminate brain disease, when Nietzsche was five. He is known to have been an isolated individual from an early age, suffering from incapacitating headaches and other physical illnesses and although a vigorous correspondent, was largely without intimate human relationships. He died in 1900 - of an indeterminate brain disease - having spent the last 12 years of his life in an institution as an invalid - probably severely mentally ill.

The only two times he is known to have proposed marriage were both impulsive and conveyed through a third person. Both proposals were turned down.

From his teenage years, he is known to have entertained the seeds of what would be the future autobiographical work "Ecce Homo" - "Behold, the Man !". At 14 he wrote a biographical sketch, which included the idea that it was his ambition "to write a little book and read it myself."

One could, with hindsight regard this as prescient and highly justified - or - regard it as a manifestation of an adolescent struggling with a greater than usual dose of inadequacy and inferiority feelings.

His early life was characterised by several idealisations - of Goethe, Schopenhauer and Wagner. He was later to have a violent disillusionment with and running denigration of Wagner. Another book of his carried the title "Twilight of the Idols".

In addition, his apparent profound isolation and depression no doubt provided a larger than circumstantial dose of nihilism to some of his philosophies.

These little biographical snippets beg further psychoanalytic exploration - but regrettably there is no time to do them justice in this paper.

In the Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society, in April of 1908, Paul Federn commented

...Nietzsche has come so close to our views ... he grasped the significance of abreaction, of repression, of flight into illness, of the instincts - the normal sexual ones as well as the sadistic instincts .... where has he not come close ?

Freud answered:

The degree of introspection achieved by Nietzsche had never been achieved by anyone, nor is it ever likely to be achieved again. What disturbs us is that Nietzsche transformed 'is' into 'ought',

which is alien to Science. In this he has remained, after all, the moralist; he could not free himself of the theologian.

Whether we would interpret the "internal theologian" as Nietzsche's dead father, or not, it remains that Freud saw Nietzsche as not free to live up to Nietzsche's own philosophy.

Freud exhorted his followers to do what he claimed Nietzsche had failed to do - to free themselves of their moralism and to replace it with scientific psychology.

Alas, this is an impossible task for any of us.

## CONCLUSION

I would like to conclude now by stating in simple form, the propositions which it has taken me the best part of an hour to develop.

The ability to hold what I have been calling "higher" moral and ethical values is a hard won developmental achievement.

The most primitive stages of mental life probably involve distinguishing between "good" and "bad" - long before cognitive, verbal considerations come in to account.

These "Kantian-style" internal structures provide a basis for allocating future percepts - both internal and external - to the categories of good or bad.

The later development of a "normal" (in the psychoanalytic sense) value system depends on the manner in which good and bad introjects relate to each other within the inner world of the individual.

Ethical and moral considerations cannot be examined in a vacuum. Ethics and Morals are essentially object-relations-determined phenomena and have no meaning outside of the way people deal with each other.

Therefore, the ultimate resolution of the "problem" of ethics and morality will ultimately fall to psychoanalytically sophisticated thinkers - (not necessarily only to psychoanalysts, of course !) - and be taken out of the realm of armchair philosophers and laboratory-bound neurophysiologists and psychologists and any others who do not maintain an object relations perspective on human mental life.

Money-Kyrle summarised these issues succinctly. To Freud's hallmarks of maturity, that is the capacity to work and play, Money-Kyrle would add the achievement of a humanistic conscience. (p. 283) That is, a conscience based on concern for its objects - not based on fear or hatred of them - nor domination by them.

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